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 Abstract 
 
 
Slovenia obtained its independence in 1991, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and embarked 
on the road to its membership in the EU. After more than a decade of transition and 
preparations for the accession, Slovenia, along with nine other accession countries, in 2004 
became a new EU member state. This paper aims at overviewing various dimensions of the 
Slovenian "story" of integration in the EU. The emphasis is on economic aspects of EU 
accession, and the focus is on those Slovenian specifics, which make its process of EU 
accession somewhat different, when compared to other transition economies in the Central 
and Eastern European region. 
 
There were many arguments for Slovenia's inclusion in the EU, historical, geographic, 
cultural, political, economic, social and security related. However, potential economic gains 
from the EU accession were decisive in the case of Slovenia. An undisputed overall 
assessment in Slovenia was that expected benefits exceed the costs of the accession and that 
net benefits are particularly to be expected in the longer run. Of course, the overall effects are 
not proportionally distributed, there are some economic or social groups which may be at risk 
after the EU accession. This should perhaps be taken into account in designing economic and 
social policies, in order to sustain economic, social and political stability and cohesion in the 
country. 
 
One year after the entry in the EU, it can be said that not much has changed in Slovenia. Most 
of the adjustments have been done before, in the period of preparations for the EU. Most 
people felt practically no difference in their everyday life. Macroeconomic overall effect was 
positive, but negligible, and sectoral effects were in the expected direction, in fact in line with 
the previous trends. There was certainly no "EU shock" in Slovenia, and no potential risks of 
the EU membership were realized. 
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Introduction 
 
Slovenia obtained its independence in 1991, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and embarked 
on the road to its membership in the EU. After more than a decade of transition and 
preparations for the accession, Slovenia, along with nine other accession countries, in 2004 
became a new EU member state. Moreover, it is very likely that Slovenia will be the first 
among new EU member states to adopt the euro, thus making another big step forward in 
European integration process, to become the 13th member country of the EMU (European 
monetary union). 
 
This paper aims at overviewing various dimensions of the Slovenian "story" of integration in 
the EU. The emphasis is on economic aspects of EU accession, and the focus is on those 
Slovenian specifics, which make its process of EU accession somewhat different, when 
compared to other transition economies in the Central and Eastern European region. The main 
text is organized as follows. 
 
The first section deals with the starting position of Slovenia, its specific initial conditions on 
the path leading towards the EU. Gradualist approach, characteristic for Slovenian structural 
reforms in the transition period and in preparations for the accession, is analysed next, and its 
advantages and drawbacks are discussed. The second section briefly mentions the main 
milestones on the road to the EU, as those institutional steps which Slovenia had to take to 
reach the final goal, its full-fledged membership in the EU. The third section is devoted to 
negotiations on the terms of Slovenia's membership in the EU. It touches upon the process of 
negotiations, its organization and concept, as well as the final results of negotiations, The 
fourth section, the central one, deals with the rationale, the benefits and costs of the EU 
accession for Slovenia. Some methodological issues are discussed first, and main expected 
economic benefits and costs are analyzed next. The fifth section goes one step further in order 
to identify possible winners and losers from the EU accession for Slovenia, taking into 
account the fact that the overall benefits and costs are not distributed proportionally across 
sectors, regions, society groups, firm or individuals. The sixth section briefly presents some 
first effects after one year of Slovenia's membership in the EU, and finds out they are in line 
with the expectations. The concluding section identifies some areas of disappointment with 
the process of the EU accession in Slovenia. 
 
 2
Starting position: Transition and integration in the EU 
 
Slovenia became an independent state in 1991, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which 
collapsed for a number of political and economic reasons, creating differences, tensions and 
finally conflicts among its federal parts. This opened the door for Slovenia to design its own 
path towards joining the EU. 
 
The starting position of Slovenia in the process of integration in the EU was determined, first, 
by a specific position of Yugoslavia in comparison with other transition countries, and, 
second, by a specific position of Slovenia within Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, as a non-aligned 
country, was clearly not a part of Western Europe, while it also could not be considered as a 
part of the Eastern block. The economic system was characterized by social ownership and 
self-management, and a quasi market economy (where firms were relatively independent and 
competing on the market), which from the late eighties underwent severe economic reforms, 
including quite intensive privatization. Slovenia, as one of the smallest Yugoslav republics, 
was the most developed one, with a strong export orientation, particularly towards the EU.  
As the border was very open and due to the proximity of Italy and Austria, Slovenian people 
could form their comparisons and value judgments with respect to advantages of the market 
economy and of the EU.  
 
Transition in Slovenia was going on at the three different levels. First, transition meant the 
transformation from a socialist to a market economy, second, a shift from a regional to a 
national economy, and third, a move from being a part of Yugoslavia to becoming a part of 
the EU. One could say there was a strong overlapping between the processes of transition and 
integration in the EU, which makes it difficult to analytically distinguish between the two 
processes and their effects on the economy.  
 
Slovenian transition, and for that matter, its approach to EU accession, is specific for its 
gradualism, cautious and successive way of implementing structural reforms. In fact, Slovenia 
can be considered as a leading example of a gradualist approach to transition. Slovenia 
intentionally gave up an alternative »big bang« approach to radical economic reforms which 
by shock therapy aims at quick and intensive changes in the economic system, thereby 
decisively cutting with the past. This »big bang« approach, chosen by some other transition 
countries, was also suggested for Slovenia by foreign advisers, headed by the IMF, at the 
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beginning of the transition. Such a »big bang« approach can cause shocks in the economy, 
lead to at least a temporary loss of output and employment, and thus to political and social 
instability which can invoke resistance to economic reforms, to their slowing down or even 
reversal. Gradualism on the other hand gives more time for adjustment, more room for the 
choice and timing of economic reforms and related economic policy measures. However, the 
weakness of gradualism is the danger that necessary structural reforms tend to be postponed 
and the process of transition as a whole slowed down.  
 
There are several reasons for Slovenia's choice of a gradual approach to structural reforms. 
The fact that Slovenia was economically the most developed country in the region meant that 
Slovenia simply could afford gradualism. It could decide for a more prudent way of 
implementing changes and adjustments, without the risk of undermining some of the positive 
achievements in its economic development so far. On the other hand, Slovenia did not need 
such a radical break with the past economic system as in most other transition economies, as 
the economic system of Yugoslavia already contained more elements of the market economy 
than in other transition countries. Additionally, there is some traditional conservativism and 
mistrust towards radical changes in the Slovenian society, where economic, social and 
political stability are valued highly, while readiness for changes requires a wide social 
consensus. All these meant that shock therapy and radical reforms with uncertain outcomes 
should be avoided. In other words, these economic, social and political reasons caused the 
gradualist approach to transition to be quite a natural choice. A typical case of gradualism is 
the concept of privatization, a limited role for foreign capital in the process of privatization, 
including the financial sector, a lower share of FDI than in comparable transition economies, 
and more reliance on capital controls. (Slovenian gradualist approach to transition is analysed 
in Mencinger, 2004 and Šušteršič, 2004). 
 
The right choice as concerns the gradualist approach to transition reforms should be 
confirmed by the performance of the economy. Throughout the period, Slovenia succeeded to 
maintain relatively high and stable growth rates, without major interruptions or 
macroeconomic imbalances. Starting from inherited hyperinflation with more than 30% 
monthly, the inflation rate was quickly brought down to normal levels. Economic growth after 
the breakdown of the Yugoslav market and war in the region, has resumed already in two 
years and contrary to some other transition economies, Slovenia was able to sustain sound 
public finance and balance of payments stability. In short, gradualism enabled Slovenia to 
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maintain economically, socially, and politically stable and sustainable process of transitional 
structural reforms, thus preparing itself for the integration in the EU. 
 
Table 1: Main macroeconomic indicators of Slovenia, 1992 - 2005 
Indicator 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 
Growth rate of real GDP (%) -5.5 5.3 3.5 3.8 4.6 2.9 3.6  
Current account balance (% of GDP) 7.4 3.8 0.2 -0.6 -2.8 1.4 0.5  
Unemployment rate (%) 8.3 9.1 7.3 7.9 7.0 6.4 6.7  
General government balance 
(% of GDP) 
0.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.8 -1.3 -3.0 -1.7  
Inflation rate (%) 201.3 19.8 9.7 7.9 8.9 7.5 4.9  
Source: Adapted from Mrak et al., 2004, p. XXVI-XXVII 
 
In the last period, however, weak points of gradualism became more and more evident. 
Gradualism manifested itself in the delayed process of privatization, avoidance of exposure of 
certain sectors to foreign competition (banking as a typical case), slow restructuring of the 
enterprise sector, etc. Critics of the gradualist approach claimed that the benefits of 
gradualism have faded away by now in Slovenia, so that a more ambitious approach to 
structural reforms is now called for. It seems that gradualism evolved into a certain inertia, 
which hinders necessary structural reforms, needed for the higher economic growth and real 
convergence with the EU and for sustaining competitive pressures on the EU internal market. 
Slovenia's entry in the EU in 2004 is in particular a new challenge which requires a 
breakthrough in economic development, which is reflected in the new strategy of economic 
development in Slovenia, adopted in 2005 and in an ambitious package of economic and 
social reforms, which should be completed in the next two years.  
 
Milestones on the road to the EU 
 
After the independence in 1991 it was obvious that the long term goal of Slovenia can only be 
its membership in the EU, in spite of  enthusiasm over newly gained own independent state 
and national sovereignty. Inclusion in the EU was supported by practically all major political 
parties (both coalition and opposition), so it can be concluded that the EU accession was an 
overall national project, based on a very broad political consensus. Among parliamentary 
parties the only exemption was a national party, which played on populistic and nationalistic 
sentiments, and was joined by some minor non-parliamentary parties and civil society groups.  
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While the support for the EU was strong among political parties, the public did not share the 
same enthusiasm. Public opinion polls showed that the support for the EU was changing over 
time, although not dramatically. (For more details, see Bučar and Brinar, 2001). This is due 
mostly to reactions to concrete developments, such as intensification of certain pressures 
coming from the EU (neighbouring countries, Italy and Austria, in the first place) at the time 
of signing the Association agreement or later in the process of negotiations for the EU 
membership, when these EU member countries tried to use Slovenian EU ambitions for 
solving some open bilateral issues. However, at the end, in 2003, after successfully concluded 
negotiations and just before signing the Treaty on EU accession, the referendum on EU 
membership showed a high level of Slovenian public support for joining the EU (with 86% of 
votes in favor of EU accession). 
 
Slovenian strategy towards European integration was defined in several official strategic 
documents. Each of them in their own way dealt not only with the strategy of economic 
development, but also with the motives for and modalities of Slovenia’s inclusion in the EU. 
First official strategic orientation that the membership in the EU is a long-term strategic goal 
for Slovenia is formulated in the Strategy of economic development of Slovenia, issued in 
1994 (Potočnik et al., 1994). Strategy of foreign economic relations of 1996 (Bobek et al., 
1996) elaborates arguments for the inclusion of Slovenia in the EU and compares this strategy 
with the alternative ones (such as autarchy, direct globalization, inclusion in some other 
regional integration). From the viewpoint of Slovenia’s inclusion in the EU, the most 
important official document is the Strategy of the EU accession of 1998 (Mrak et al., 1998). 
This document defines a rounded up program of consistent mid-term structural reforms and a 
set of concrete measures of economic and social policies, necessary for winding up the 
transition process and preparing the economy for EU accession.  
 
In 1992 Slovenia officially applied for an Association agreement with the EU (also known as 
the Europe agreement). The Association agreement was signed on the 10 of July, 1996, and 
on the same day Slovenia presented an application for a full-fledged membership in the EU. It 
is interesting to note that Slovenia was the last one to sign the Association agreement with the 
EU among the first wave of candidate countries, in spite of the fact that Slovenia has 
throughout that period been considered as one of the most prepared candidate countries for 
the inclusion in the EU.  
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In 1997 the European Commission in its document Agenda 2000 prepared an opinion on the 
fulfilment of the EU accession criteria for the six candidate countries, which by that time 
applied for the EU membership. Accession criteria (or the so-called Copenhagen criteria) 
were broadly defined as minimum political, economic and legal standards which a candidate 
country had to meet in order to qualify for the EU accession. On the basis of accession criteria 
an opinion was presented as to whether an individual candidate country is ready to start 
negotiations with the EU on the terms of its EU membership. In this first assessment, 
Slovenia complied with two out of the three accession criteria. Slovenia was sufficiently 
meeting political and economic criteria, while the third, legal criterion (ability to take on 
obligations from the EU membership) at the time had not yet been fulfilled.  
 
Negotiations started on the 31 of March, 1998. Slovenia was in the first group of six candidate 
countries (the so-called Luxembourg group), assessed as ready to start the negotiations. Later, 
in 2000, they were joined by a group of another six candidate countries (the so-called Helsinki 
group). Negotiations were concluded on the 13 of December, 2002.  
 
On the 25 of October, 2002, the European Council declared that ten out of twelve candidate 
countries would be ready to join the EU in 2004. This group consisted of eight transition 
countries, including Slovenia, plus Malta and Cyprus. Before joining the EU, Slovenia on the 
23 of March, 2003 held a referendum on its EU membership. On the 16 of April, 2003, 
Accession treaties were signed, which had to be ratified by both sides involved (in fact in all 
old EU member countries as well) in time, so that on the 1 of May, 2004, Slovenia along with 
other nine candidate countries, became a new EU member country.  
 
Negotiations 
 
The accession process, which started as soon as Slovenia delivered its formal application for 
the EU membership, consisted of several phases. First, the European Commission had to 
prepare an assessment of Slovenia’s readiness to start the negotiations. This was followed by 
screening, an overview of the state of domestic legislation in comparison with the European 
one (the so called Acquis communautaire). Next, the process of negotiations took place, first 
by defining negotiating positions on individual areas of the acquis by both sides, and next 
through concrete negotiations on the terms of Slovenia’s membership in the EU. Obviously, 
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in terms of substance, the most important part of the accession process was the process of 
negotiations on the terms of the EU membership.  
 
At the center of negotiations is acquis communitaire, a large body of European legislation, 
laws, rules and regulations which the EU candidate countries have to build in their legal 
systems. The essence of the negotiations, however, is when and how the candidate countries 
would adjust their domestic legislation to the European one. In the process of the negotiations 
the acquis was structured into 31 chapters, according to the main substance areas. For each of 
these chapters, both the EU and a candidate country prepared their negotiating positions, as 
their official starting points, and from there on real negotiations could begin. For each chapter, 
candidate countries agreed on necessary changes to domestic legislation and accompanying 
policies, while both sides could in special cases ask for exemptions from the complete 
adoption of the acquis. In the process of the negotiations, EU requirements were horizontal, 
which means that the negotiating positions of the EU across individual chapters were identical 
for all the candidate countries, while an individual candidate country according to its own 
specifics had to negotiate more favorable terms. Two kinds of exemption from the full acquis 
were available for the candidate countries: a) transition period, as a temporary exemption, 
which gives a country more time for adjustment, and b) derogation, as a permanent (lasting 
until lifted) exemption, which means that the country does not have to take over the complete 
European legislation in that area. Derogations were in fact approved very exceptionally. The 
third type of exemptions represent safeguard clauses, the right to suspend a certain part of the 
acquis if a country failed to fulfil accepted obligations. Safeguard clauses were primarily 
intended for the EU side, and not for the candidate countries.  
 
A negotiating team, a narrower group of experts, was formed in Slovenia to conduct the 
negotiations, and the working groups for the individual chapters were established. The leader 
of the negotiating team has in the process repeatedly warned that although formally the 
negotiations seem to be with the EU, the real negotiations take actually place within the 
country (Potočnik and Lombardero, 2004). The point is that an agreement on necessary 
changes and adjustments has to be reached inside the country, which is not always easy. The 
perspective of EU membership can be an argument in favor of accepting structural reforms 
which require sometimes painful adjustment. Moreover, it helps dismantle some entrenched 
barriers, such as local monopolistic positions, existing rents and interests of the pressure 
groups.  
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Slovenia’s negotiations with the EU started in 1998. Negotiations took place successively, 
starting with easier chapters and later moving on towards more difficult ones. Real 
negotiations on a financial package of membership (contributions to the EU budget and 
payments from it for the agricultural policy, structural and cohesion funds in the period 2004-
2006) started at the end of the negotiations, in 2002. The leading principle in negotiations that 
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed« meant that when individual negotiating chapters 
were closed, commitments were just provisional. They became final only when all chapters 
were closed, i.e. when the whole package was agreed upon.  
 
At the beginning, Slovenia presented its negotiating positions on 29 chapters (two were not 
yet opened at that time). As its overall starting position, Slovenia asked for 22 transitory 
periods and 6 derogations. (Details can be seen in Mejač, 2000). Needless to say, these 
requirements were not distributed proportionally across chapters. There were in fact 19 
chapters where Slovenia did not ask for any exemption, which means that in these areas 
Slovenia committed itself to fully adopt the acquis by the time of the EU accession. The 
highest concentration of required exemptions was in some of the most demanding negotiating 
chapters, such as agriculture and environment. As far as the dynamics of the negotiations is 
concerned, three chapters were closed in 1998, six in 1999, five in 2000, twelve in 2001 and 
five in 2002.  
 
At the end of 2002, negotiations were closed. Slovenia finally negotiated 18 transition periods 
and 2 derogations. The results are quite comparable to the starting negotiating position, 
although the comparison can not be a direct one, as in time some of the negotiating positions 
evolved into something else, such as a concrete financial obligation or a similar agreement.  
 
An overall assessment for the case of Slovenia is that negotiations were smooth and 
successful. Officially, Slovenia was satisfied with the results of the negotiations, as most of 
the requirements defined as its starting negotiating position were accepted. (Official results of 
negotiations are presented in Kezunovič, 2003. For an analytical assessment of the results, see 
Bučar and Brinar, 2005). In the public, the view that negotiations were a success, prevailed. 
(Some issues which raised certain problems and were not accepted well in the Slovenian 
public, are presented in Bučar and Brinar, 2005). There was no major debate on the issue of 
whether Slovenia could or should gain more in some of the areas. Specific for Slovenia was 
that in negotiations on each chapter, negotiating position first had to be confirmed by the 
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government and approved by the relevant parliamentary committee. This gave the process of 
negotiations more transparency and possibly more public support.  
 
Benefits and costs of the EU accession 
 
In comparison with some other transition countries the Slovenian attitude towards the EU 
could best be described as realistic. A lack of uncritical enthusiasm can be jointly explained 
by the fact that Slovenia did not need a radical political breakthrough with the past and that as 
the most economically developed transition economy in the region, it could afford more self-
confidence. A good starting position contributed to not idealizing the EU, but rather to 
assessing it objectively in the light of alternative development strategies of Slovenia, and to 
evaluating the potential benefits and costs of the EU accession. (For a balanced view on the 
rationale, costs and benefits of the EU accession for Slovenia, see Inotai and Stanovnik, 
2004). 
 
Slovenia has always been a part of European geographic and cultural space. Historical factors, 
geographic location, cultural tradition, and economic links with Europe are reasons which 
basically predetermine Slovenian aspirations for inclusion within the European integration 
processes. There are many arguments in favor of Slovenia’s inclusion in the EU. Reasons for 
joining the EU are economic and political, including security. In the case of Slovenia, the 
main driving forces of integration are clearly economic reasons. The focus in the following 
text is on economic aspects of inclusion in the EU, while other arguments, such as additional 
military security, political stability, political relevance, etc., are disregarded here. These non-
economic aspects of the EU accession process are particularly difficult to identify and 
measure, as they mostly involve qualitative dimension and value judgments. 
 
In the last instance, the long-term goal of the EU accession for Slovenia is to increase the 
welfare, economic growth and living standards, and to catch up with the EU in terms of 
economic development. Eliminations of barriers to trade with the EU and integration in its 
internal market should lead to an increase in trade, inflow of foreign capital and finally to 
more employment and economic growth. These arguments for the EU accession are of course 
not specific just for Slovenia, they are more or less equally shared among all other candidate 
countries with transition economies. A specific feature of Slovenia, as a very small and open 
economy, strongly oriented towards the EU, is the fact that without a free access to a broad 
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market, such as the internal market of the EU, its economy practically could not survive. For 
Slovenia the only realistic option, and therefore its primary long-term strategic goal is to join 
the EU. In short, accession in the EU for Slovenia represents an opportunity to take advantage 
of a large and open market as a way to achieving more stability, faster economic growth and 
higher living standards for the Slovenian population.  
 
Assessment of the benefits and costs of EU accession opens considerable methodological 
problems. Firstly, the process of integration in the EU is tightly overlapping with the process 
of transition. It is analytically difficult to differentiate between the effects of the two 
processes. Some of the costs of the adjustment to the EU were at the same time part of the 
transitional adjustment, i.e. structural reforms which would have to be undertaken anyway. 
Secondly, another methodological problem is related to the fact that inclusion in the EU is not 
momentous, but has a time dimension, and its benefits and costs are changing in time. The 
process of EU integration goes through different phases (informal preparations, association 
agreement, accession phase) before entry in the EU finally happens. Some of the structural 
reforms and adjustments, bringing along related benefits and costs, are undertaken in the 
anticipation of future EU integration, some as the result of the association agreement, some in 
the pre-accession period and some at the time of the EU accession. Theoretically, the effects 
of integration in the EU should be assessed for its individual phases, but practically, analysts 
have to draw a line somewhere in order to assess benefits and costs of the EU accession for a 
candidate country. 
 
There were several studies (Potočnik and Majcen, 1996, Majcen, 1999, Damijan, 2002) 
carried out on the assessment of expected benefits and costs of Slovenia’s accession in the 
EU, with different methodological approach to the above mentioned problems, so their results 
are not directly comparable. However, they all came with the same overall result that the 
benefits exceed the costs of the EU accession. Net benefits are expected particularly in the 
longer run, when most of the adjustment has already been accomplished, while the flow of 
benefits continues. Although in general different studies broadly agree on the sectors which 
would benefit most from the EU accession and on the sectors which could be at risk, concrete 
results in different studies depended on methodological assumptions, including on 
macroeconomic policies used.  
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Expected benefits of the EU accession are in fact similar to the goals of integration in the EU. 
The main advantage of Slovenia’s inclusion in the EU is its deeper integration in the internal 
market of the EU, while the main catalyst of positive effects is trade liberalization with the 
EU. However, it has to be said that that a large part of Slovenia's foreign trade has been 
liberalized already at the time of signing and implementing the Association agreement, or, for 
that matter, even beforehand. Another source of expected benefits is financing from the EU 
budget, i.e. from the common agricultural policy (CAP), as well as from structural and 
cohesion funds of the EU. These EU financial sources lead to more investment, development 
of infrastructure and promotion of regional development.  
 
Most of the costs of EU accession are in fact of a non-economic nature. Loss of recently 
acquired national sovereignty and political independence, questions of cultural identity and 
the use of national language are among the most debated hot issues of the EU accession. As 
far as economic costs are concerned, in the first place there are costs of adjustment of the 
Slovenian economy to the requirements of the single market of the EU. Most of these 
economic costs, related primarily to the adoption of the acquis and harmonization to the EU 
standards, have occurred over the longer period in the pre-accession period of preparations for 
the EU. Economic costs are involved also in the cancellation of some free-trade agreements 
with the countries of the former Yugoslavia, as a consequence of joining the EU, since 
Slovenian exports to this region would now be on less favorable terms, i.e. burdened with 
tariff duties. The cumulative cost of this effect over the forthcoming years was estimated to be 
around 1% of the GDP (Damijan, 2002). Other economic costs of the EU accession are 
related to the closing of some non-competitive firms, more unemployment and rising prices in 
certain sectors. Another economic cost of the EU for Slovenia is financing of the so-called 
Schengen border, an outside border of the EU between Slovenia as a new EU member country 
and Croatia as a non-member country of the EU. 
 
When discussing benefits and costs of EU accession for Slovenia one should not forget that 
the concept of benefits and costs is sometimes used also in another area of integration, 
integration in the EMU (European monetary union). To start with, Slovenia as a new EU 
member country can not opt out of the EMU. Slovenia joined the EU with a derogation 
regarding the adoption of the euro, but has the obligation to join the eurozone when it is 
ready, i.e. when it fulfils the Maastricht convergence criteria. The assessment of the potential 
benefits and costs of the EMU, although having an analytical value, is thus of little relevance 
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for the decision-making on the path to monetary integration. Nevertheless, assessments of 
expected benefits and costs of the EMU for Slovenia show that benefits exceed costs, which 
means that Slovenia should look forward to joining the eurozone. Furthermore, Slovenia 
meets most of the optimum currency area (OCA) criteria (Lavrač and Žumer, 2003). OCA 
theory claims that gains from the EMU may increase, and losses diminish, or the other way 
round, depending on specific structural characteristics of the economy. According to this 
theory Slovenia by meeting most of the OCA criteria seems to be a very suitable candidate for 
the EMU. Slovenia is not expected to be exposed to specific asymmetric shocks once in the 
EMU, and the adjustment mechanisms in its economy are flexible enough to deal with such 
shocks, should they eventually arise.  
 
The real issue concerning costs and benefits of the EMU for Slovenia is probably the 
following one: What are the benefits and costs of an early inclusion in the EMU for Slovenia, 
compared to a delayed one? Supported by some analytical argumentation, Slovenia decided 
for an early inclusion in the EMU (Bank of Slovenia, 2003 and Lavrač, 2003). Preparations 
for an early adoption of the euro, including efforts to fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria 
as soon as possible, became the priority of the Slovenian macroeconomic policies in the last 
few years. At the end of 2005, Slovenia is in a good position to comply with all of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria on time and to adopt the euro as planned, in the beginning of 
2007. 
 
Table 2: Maastricht convergence criteria for Slovenia in 2004 
Convergence 
criteria 
Inflation Fiscal deficit Public debt Long-term 
interest rate 
Exchange rate 
stability 
Reference value 2,4% 3% GDP 60% GDP 6.4% 2 years in ERM II 
Slovenia 4,1% 2% GDP 29.4% GDP 5.2% Entry in ERM II 
in June 28, 2004 
Source: Adapted from European Commission, 2004, p.3 
 
Winners and losers of the EU accession 
 
Benefits and costs of the EU accession are, however, not distributed proportionally in time 
and space, as well as among different sectors of the economy and groups in the society. 
Undoubtedly, a broad conviction in Slovenia is that the overall benefits of the EU accession 
exceed its costs, i.e. that Slovenia as a whole will gain from joining the EU. However, there 
are some economic, social or interest groups which will become exposed to risks and 
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pressures as a consequence of the EU entry. As benefits and costs of the EU accession are not 
equally shared, there will be winners and losers in the process. (For a deeper insight into 
winners and losses from EU integration for Slovenia, see Stanovnik et al., 2000). 
 
There are certain groups in society which can expect net benefits from the EU accession, and 
others which can expect net costs. The former groups, which may include whole economic 
sectors, individual firms, or population groups, are the winners of the EU accession, and the 
latter are losers of the EU accession, depending on whether their economic position is 
expected to improve or worsen as a consequence of the inclusion in the EU. Positive effects 
from joining the EU are in the first place expected for consumers. They are the main winners 
of EU accession, since they profit from a wider consumer choice, higher quality and lower 
prices of products as the result of increased competition on the single market. However, most 
of the consumers are at the same time in one way or another also producers. Their economic 
position as producers may change after EU accession for the better or for the worse, 
depending on how successfully their enterprises are competing on the market.  
 
The winners of the EU accession are definitely to be found among exporters which in general 
benefit from liberalization of foreign trade and inclusion in the common trade policy of the 
EU. Slovenian exporting firms now strongly present and competitive on the EU internal 
market are among the main winners from EU accession. Those firms which will be able to 
attract new investment and participate in financing from structural and cohesion funds of the 
EU will also be winners from EU accession. Small private entrepreneurs, and a highly skilled 
labor force should be counted as winners as well. Finally, some social groups, such as 
younger educated people, or in general an active part of the population, seeing inclusion in the 
EU as an opportunity and a challenge, are among the winners of the EU accession.  
 
Those expected to have their economic position worsened after joining the EU, are in the first 
place to be sought in presently non-competitive economic sectors. Those sectors and firms 
which failed to restructure on time and now enjoy domestic protection from foreign 
competition, are the main losers from integration in the EU. Farmers and agricultural firms 
could also be amongst the losers, but for them the overall effect of the EU accession depends 
on Slovenian agricultural policy and on the financial support from the CAP. 
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Obviously there is a strong connection between the position of being a winner or loser of the 
EU accession and the support for the inclusion in the EU. The more people are informed and 
rational, the stronger this link is. Based on their self-interest it is reasonable to assume that the 
winners will support the EU accession, and the losers reject it.  
 
Economic effects of the EU accession in the first year 
 
In May 2004 Slovenia along with other nine countries become a new member state of the EU. 
A year after the EU accession it is time to make the first assessment and to see to what extent 
the expectations from the EU membership have been realized. In general, it can be concluded 
that for the most economic subjects the mere EU accession in itself did not bring many 
immediate changes. The aggregate economic impact was rather weak, certainly there was no 
“EU accession shock”, or a structural break which would alter the characteristics and 
functioning of the Slovenian economy. Over the years the Slovenian economy has in the 
process of pre-accession adjustment already adapted to the requirements of the EU single 
market. Expected longer term effects on economic growth, coming from the expansion of 
trade, easier access to foreign capital, technology and knowledge, should be seen only over 
the longer period, in the forthcoming years.  
 
The direct effects of EU accession on the Slovenian economy are in the first place related to 
the change in the trade regime. Change in the trade regime meant adoption of the EU common 
trade policy, which for Slovenia implied an elimination of residual customs duties for some 
sensitive agricultural imports from the EU, a lifting of customs formalities with the EU and a 
termination of Slovenian free trade arrangements with some former Yugoslav countries 
(Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). The combined effect of these changes in the 
trade regime was the shift in the regional structure of Slovenian trade (increase in the trade 
with the EU, decline of trade with ex-Yugoslav countries, except for Croatia, where the 
customs duties have already been abolished beforehand), changes in the magnitude of trade 
with the agricultural products (increase of imports, decrease in exports), agricultural and food-
processing industries’ output (drop of 6.8% in the production in 2004), and in the prices of 
agricultural products (some lowering of the prices).  
 
For most of the Slovenian exporters in industry and services increased exposure to 
international competition after the EU accession was not much felt, as the successful 
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exporting sectors retained their export dynamics. (Data in this section are based on the study 
Bednaš, 2005, where also some other effects of the EU accession, such as entry in ERM II, 
and effect on public finance situation, are analysed). While the overall effect on the 
manufacturing sector was not significant, some industrial sectors retained their production and 
export activity after the EU accession (chemical, metals, electrical and optical equipment, 
rubber and plastics) or even raised it (pulp and paper, non-metal minerals, machinery and 
equipment), while some labor–intensive industries continued facing problems (textiles, 
leather, furniture). Finally, there were sectors with negative impact on their activity since the 
EU accession (food, beverages and tobacco industries).  
 
In the end, it can be concluded that some of the macroeconomic risks, to which Slovenia 
exposed itself after the EU accession, have not materialized in the first year. There was no 
rapid decline in international competitiveness in some problematic labor intensive sectors 
which otherwise could have caused problems for the Slovenian overall economic growth and 
employment. Negative trends in these sectors, where restructuring was insufficient or lagging, 
rather continued in line with expectations, also after the EU accession.  
 
Some areas of disappointment 
 
As mentioned before, while Slovenian political elites were strongly in favor of the inclusion 
in the EU, public opinion polls showed less uncritical enthusiasm and support for the 
Slovenia’s EU accession. There were certain areas of disappointment with the process of 
integration in the EU, some of them shared among all the candidate countries, and others 
specific for Slovenia.  
 
First, as the process of enlargement of the EU lasted for more than a decade, the EU itself in 
time underwent considerable changes. From the point of view of candidate countries this 
means they were in fact shooting at a moving target. In the last couple of years, just before the 
EU accession, the changes in the EU were for the worse, which is a cause for disillusionment 
with the EU in the eyes of the candidate countries. When the EU accession was approaching, 
it became clear that the EU was not what it should have been according to expectations at the 
beginning of the integration process. Recent developments in the EU, such as poor economic 
growth, high and persistent unemployment, weakening competitiveness compared with other 
economic regions, avoidance and delay of necessary structural reforms in leading EU 
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countries, problems with the implementation of the Lisbon strategy, failure of adopting the 
European constitution, problems with reaching an agreement on the European budget for the 
next financial perspective 2007-2013, can be listed among the main areas of disappointment. 
It seems that the old EU member countries are primarily interested in retaining their existing 
privileges and maximizing their net position with the EU budget, which indicates that narrow 
national interests and selfishness at the moment prevail over a broader European integrationist 
spirit.  
 
Second, another area of dissatisfaction is the use of the balance of power between the EU and 
the candidate countries in the process of EU enlargement. In the candidate countries it was 
often felt as if the interest for the enlargement of the EU was only on their side, as if 
economic and political benefits from the enlargement for the other side did not exist at all. It 
was emphasized that the candidate countries are wishing to join the club, and not the other 
way round, so they have to accept its rules as they are, in principle as a whole, based on “take 
it or leave it” argument. The process of the EU accession was thus somehow one-sided, based 
on the existing balance of power, while an opportunity for a dialog among equals was not 
exploited. Most of the negotiations on the terms of the EU membership were in fact just 
taking over the European legal order, while concessions given to the candidate countries were 
rather rare. In the process of negotiations, and even before, the use of double standards, lack 
of clear principals and power of national interests of individual old EU member countries 
were frequently felt.  
 
Third, next area of disillusionment was the concept of accession itself. At first it was 
understood that the candidate counties would be accepted to the EU according to their own 
merits, i.e. their efforts in preparation and readiness in terms of meeting the Copenhagen 
accession criteria, and not in a package, as a block. In other words, the leading principle of 
enlargement was supposed to be a “regatta” approach, where the best reach the goal as first, 
and not a “convoy” approach, where the best have to wait for the others. At the beginning it 
looked as if the first approach was actually used, as the first group of six best prepared 
candidate countries (Luxembourg group) was selected to start negotiations on the EU 
accession. However, two years later they were joined by another group of six candidate 
countries (Helsinki group), which in the process of negotiations somehow miraculously 
succeeded in catching up with the first group, so that in 1994 ten accession countries finally 
joined the EU. The convoy approach in the end prevailed over the regatta approach, which 
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was rather disappointing for a country like Slovenia, throughout the process considered to be 
among the best prepared candidate countries for the EU accession. Slovenian efforts to 
conclude negotiations early, even at a price of giving up some national interests, in the end 
turned out to be rather futile, as the same result could probably be achieved anyway, with less 
efforts and sacrifice.  
 
Forth, Slovenians were quite surprised by the fact that the public opinion in the EU was not in 
favor of Slovenia as an accession country. When asked which countries would be welcome 
members of the EU, Slovenia was as a rule ranked low, at the bottom of the ladder, just in 
front of some problematic or exotic candidate countries. Slovenians found no rational 
explanation for the obviously bad image of Slovenia, as according to some objective 
indicators, such as the level of economic development, where if was the leading candidate 
country, it should be rather somewhere at the top of the ladder. Disappointed by these 
messages, Slovenians offered some explanations, such as the following: a) Slovenia is not 
known enough in the EU, so a better promotion is needed, b) Slovenia is because of the 
similarity of the name mixed with Slovakia or even Slavonia, a region in Croatia, c) Slovenia 
is unjustly placed into some problematic regions, such as ex-Yugoslavia or Balkans. The fact 
that Slovenia was not very popular in the EU, fired back, so that Slovenians themselves had 
probably less reasons to be enthusiastic about the EU accession. 
 
Fifth, in more concrete terms, the sensitive issues of negotiations on the EU accession, such as 
agriculture, environment, regional policies, budgetary flows with the EU, Schengen border, 
etc., could always be seen as areas where more could be gained or less lost for Slovenia. 
However, in public discussion, these matters did not attract the main attention. The main areas 
of dissatisfaction have to do more with some specific problems which Slovenia met along the 
path to the EU, either in the process of negotiations, or even before, at the time of preparing 
the Association agreement. The main areas of disappointment which raised a lot of attention 
and led to heated public debates have to do with the two issues: The rights of the EU citizens 
to purchase land in Slovenia even before signing the association agreement and demands of 
the EU to close Slovenian free-trade shops on the state borders with Italy and Austria before 
the EU accession. Of course, selection of the problematic issues is by definition to some 
extent subjective, and an alternative list of topics, including for instance the treatment of 
denationalization in the negotiations and approach to the possibilities for the migration of the 
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Slovenian labor force to the EU, could be prepared as well. (For a detailed and balanced 
assessment of the mentioned main problematic issues, see Bučar and Brinar, 2005). 
 
Conclusions  
 
Slovenia became an independent state in 1991, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Slovenian 
transition process had a triple dimension: a) transformation of the economic system, b) shift 
from a regional to a national economy, and c) change from being a part of the federal state to 
becoming a member country of the EU. 
 
When embarking on the road towards its EU membership Slovenia had some starting 
advantages, compared to other transition economies in the Central and Eastern European 
region. Favorable initial conditions had to do with the legacy of the former Yugoslav 
economic system with quasi market economy and with the fact that Slovenia was, and still is, 
economically most developed among the countries in the region. This helps explain why 
Slovenia chose gradualist approach to structural reforms in the process of transition and in 
preparations for the EU accession. Slovenian gradualism contributed to maintaining 
economic, political and social stability throughout the period, but also to less dynamism, some 
inertia and delays in needed structural reforms, thus losing some of the initial advantages in 
the process of EU accession. 
 
While the process of integration in the EU as a whole was smooth and successful, it is 
interesting to note that Slovenia was the last among the candidate countries to sign an 
Association agreement with the EU, although throughout the period Slovenia has always been 
considered as one of the best prepared candidate countries. Later on, in the process of 
negotiations with the EU on the terms of Slovenia's membership in the EU, the results of 
negotiations were well accepted in the public. This was finally confirmed by a highly positive 
outcome of the 2003 Slovenian referendum on its EU membership. 
 
There were many arguments for Slovenia's inclusion in the EU, historical, geographic, 
cultural, political, economic, social and security related. However, potential economic gains 
from the EU accession were decisive in the case of Slovenia. An undisputed overall 
assessment in Slovenia was that expected benefits exceed the costs of the accession and that 
net benefits are particularly to be expected in the longer run. Of course, the overall effects are 
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not proportionally distributed, there are some economic or social groups which may be at risk 
after the EU accession. This should perhaps be taken into account in designing economic and 
social policies, in order to sustain economic, social and political stability and cohesion in the 
country. 
 
One year after the entry in the EU, it can be said that not much has changed in Slovenia. Most 
of the adjustments have been done before, in the period of preparations for the EU. Most 
people felt practically no difference in their everyday life. Macroeconomic overall effect was 
positive, but negligible, and sectoral effects were in the expected direction, in fact in line with 
the previous trends. There was certainly no "EU shock" in Slovenia, and no potential risks of 
the EU membership were realized. 
 
Finally, Slovenia decided for an early entry in ERM II and EMU. The plan is to adopt the 
euro in the beginning of 2007, less than three years after the EU accession. At the moment, 
Slovenia is in a good position to fulfil all the Maastricht convergence criteria on time and to 
become the 13th member country of the eurozone, the first among the new EU member states. 
This is seen as another important step in depending the EU integration in Slovenia, which 
builds upon and upgrades its successful inclusion in the EU. 
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